Although knowledge sharing among competitors is seemingly counterintuitive, scholars have found that competitors share knowledge under certain conditions: among actors who have a pre-existing relationship and who expect direct reciprocity. However, there are examples of knowledge sharing among competitors that cannot fully be explained using these relational mechanisms. In this study, I propose that in markets where competitors are a set of key stakeholders, knowledge sharing is a strategic response to high levels of buy-in uncertainty related to a potential opportunity, namely the likelihood that stakeholders will come to realize the value of a potential opportunity in a timely fashion. Using a unique dataset of knowledge sharing among investment professionals on a digital platform, this study leverages variation in the platform's knowledge-sharing structure to test this theory. I find that knowledge sharing among these competitors is most likely when buy-in uncertainty for a given opportunity is high and that this knowledge sharing does lead to subsequent buy-in.
Introduction
Communities have long brought people together who have similar interests and passions with the goal of creating and sharing knowledge, from the guild system of the Middle Ages to more recent online communities such as Quora and Stack Overflow. Online communities virtually connect individuals, allowing for larger and more diverse groups of people to come together to exchange knowledge. Digital platforms are one popular type of online community that promotes knowledge sharing among participants; this is achieved through various designs, such as question and answer (e.g., Quora and Stack Overflow), evaluations and ratings (e.g., Rotten Tomatoes and Yelp), and free-form discussion (e.g., Facebook and Reddit).
Although most of these digital platforms are casual, firms have increasingly begun using this emergent organizational form strategically to promote knowledge sharing within the firm (Constant, Sproull, and Kiesler 1996; Hwang, Singh, and Argote 2015; Jeppesen and Frederiksen 2006) , and there are no signs of this trend slowing down (McKinsey & Company 2013 ). This appears to be a worthwhile knowledge strategy for firms, since knowledge plays an integral role in improving firm outcomes (Argote 2012; Argote and Ingram 2000; Hansen 2002; Zander and Kogut 1995; Reagans and McEvily 2008) and digital platforms provide an efficient means for knowledge exchange. The willingness of employees to engage in these firm-hosted knowledge-sharing platforms is intuitive given their personal investment in their firm (Constant, Sproull, and Kiesler 1996) , and there is a long history of employees gathering informally to share knowledge through "communities of practice," for example (Wenger 1998; Wenger, McDermott, and Snyder 2002) . Given that this organizational form eliminates many frictions related to knowledge sharing within firms, under what conditions may we also expect these platforms to lead to knowledge sharing across competing firms?
For knowledge to yield a competitive advantage to a firm, it must be true that it cannot easily be imitated or learned by a firm's competitors (Lippman and Rumelt 1982) . Therefore, in addition to the general costs of knowledge sharing, such that it is time consuming and does not guarantee a positive return ex ante, knowledge sharing among competitors introduces a strategic cost: the potential loss of competitive advantage. Despite this cost, organization and strategy scholars have highlighted that competitors do come together to share competitive knowledge. Further, this research elucidates the conditions under which these costs of knowledge sharing among competitors are minimized, thus facilitating such sharing (Ap-pleyard 1996; Fauchart and von Hippel 2008; von Hippel 1987; Ingram and Roberts 2000; Schrader 1991 ). Specifically, pre-existing relationships, expectations of direct reciprocity, and slow-moving technology commonly accompany instances of knowledge sharing among competitors. This reasoning is primarily relational, explaining the likelihood of knowledge sharing occurring between a given dyad of competitors.
However, these explanations fall short of explaining more recent instances of knowledge sharing that are much broader, whereby knowledge is shared with an audience via a common platform (e.g. Towers Watson 2012; Value Investing Congress 2014b , 2014a . Here, those sharing have little to no control over who has access to this knowledge making motivations related to these relational mechanisms less likely. Moreover, in these contexts, technology is often fast moving, allowing competitors to incorporate this shared knowledge quickly.
Thus, there is a gap in our understanding of the conditions that sustain competitors coming together more broadly on a platform to engage in knowledge sharing.
I address this gap in our understanding by developing a theory related to a market-based mechanism, which I call "buy-in uncertainty," or uncertainty about the likelihood that key stakeholders will come to realize the value of a potential opportunity in a timely fashion. This is because, in most contexts, it is extremely difficult to objectively demonstrate an opportunity's potential value. For example, the expected future value of investing in a new technology is challenging to discern. To reap the benefits of having identified a potential opportunity in one's market, actors often rely on key stakeholders' realizing that this opportunity is worthwhile and buying in to-adopting, endorsing, or committing resources to-the opportunity. Thus, I posit that in markets where competitors are a set of key stakeholders, knowledge sharing is a strategic avenue for addressing this buy-in uncertainty, such that as buy-in uncertainty increases so does the likelihood that an actor shares detailed knowledge about an opportunity with their competitors. Because this need for buy-in helps alleviate the potential costs associated with knowledge sharing, competitors are most apt to share in these cases.
To test this theory, I use data from a digital knowledge-sharing platform, the Real Investors Club (a pseudonym) for "buy-side" (e.g., hedge fund, mutual fund) investment professionals (e.g., analysts, portfolio managers). On this platform, investment professionals submit investment recommendations (to buy or short sell a stock) about a potential investment opportunity they have identified (i.e., that a stock is under-or overpriced). An important feature of this setting is that it provides a baseline against which to compare knowledge sharing, as opposed to simply selecting on instances of knowledge sharing. When an investment professional chooses to submit a recommendation they must include a justification for this position. The accompanying justification can be detailed, having a minimum of 600 words (averaging over 1,400 words), or simple, having a maximum of 40 words (averaging 24 words). This difference is critical because stating one's buy or sell recommendation, after their firm takes that position, does not constitute competitive knowledge sharing beyond the often publicly available information, since portfolio holdings are commonly available to others in this industry (e.g., Form 13F). However, recommendations with a detailed justification provide competitive knowledge, namely elements from the analysis that supports the recommendation, which competitors are typically not privy to. This analysis is a fundamental component of the value an investment professional brings to their firm and thus their firm's competitive advantage (Groysberg and Lee 2008) .
I specifically focus on the relationship between buy-in uncertainty, measured as the level of scrutiny and attention that a focal firm/stock 1 faces from evaluative institutions in the market (e.g., the media, sell-side analysts), and the likelihood that an investment professional shares knowledge in the form of their analysis through a detailed justification when they submit a recommendation for an investment opportunity. The main contribution of this research is enhancing our understanding of the dynamics of knowledge sharing among competitors and the growing use of digital platforms by firms to improve their strategy more broadly. While extant research has focused on the role of relational mechanisms in supporting knowledge sharing among a pair of competitors, my theory focuses on the role of a market-based mechanism in helping sustain much broader instances knowledge sharing among competitors. Specifically, I show that competitors are more likely to broadly engage in knowledge sharing with one another when there is considerable uncertainty with regards to the likelihood that key stakeholders will similarly identify a given opportunity in a timely fashion. The findings from this research also complement work that has focused on the cooperative behavior among competing firms and the general motivations for contributing to digital platforms.
1. A stock refers to the shares that are issued by a publicly traded firm. In most cases, I use the terms "stock" and "firm" interchangeably.
Knowledge Sharing within Firms
Knowledge, such as best practices, expertise, and firm routines, is a strategic resource for firms. Developing an ability to effectively manage and transfer such knowledge within a firm is a lucrative investment, as evidence suggests that it helps improve firm outcomes (Argote 2012; Argote and Ingram 2000; Hansen 2002; Zander and Kogut 1995; Reagans and McEvily 2008) . Managers who have realized this fact have encouraged their employees to come together to engage in knowledge sharing, such as through "communities of practice" (e.g., Thompson 2005) . These communities are normally informal and bring together likeminded people within the firm who have similar expertise, interests, or passions, with the goal of building, debating, and exchanging knowledge around an issue (Wenger 1998; Wenger, McDermott, and Snyder 2002) . For example, employees from across the firm may come together to discuss a firm's response to an emerging technology in its market. Leveraging their experience and expertise, members can discuss different perspectives on how best to embrace and respond to this strategic shift.
Over time, these within-firm knowledge-based communities have moved beyond in-person gatherings, leading to a new organizational form using online communities that bring employees together to share knowledge (Constant, Sproull, and Kiesler 1996; Hwang, Singh, and Argote 2015; Jeppesen and Frederiksen 2006) . These digital platforms enable larger, often global, sets of individuals to come together, creating an efficient medium for communication.
These platforms are more likely to assemble a diverse set of knowledge and disseminate it throughout the firm instead of keeping it siloed, or local (Hwang, Singh, and Argote 2015) .
Further, by institutionalizing knowledge sharing through a digital platform, firms can build a repository of shared knowledge for future use. For these reasons, digital knowledge-sharing platforms are aligned with a firm's goal of maximizing their return to knowledge and are increasingly being leveraged by firms. Results from a McKinsey & Company survey (2013), for example, demonstrates that the number of firms using a digital platform to facilitate knowledge sharing nearly doubled over a five-year period.
Knowledge Sharing across Firms
Although knowledge is a significant resource for firms, there are limitations to the amount of novel knowledge that can be created and exchanged within a specific firm (e.g., Powell, Koput, and Smith-Doerr 1996) , with competitors serving as an important source for knowledge outside of the firm. Recognizing this value, firms routinely watch their competitors, analyzing any information that becomes available (Baum and Dahlin 2007; Haunschild and Sullivan 2002; Madsen and Desai 2010) . Although there is evident value in a competitor's knowledge, it is not surprising that firms may hesitate to directly engage in knowledge sharing with their competitors. An important task for managers is to preserve their competitive advantage by ensuring that knowledge does not "leak" to competitors (Liebeskind 1996) , especially when this knowledge can be used (Lippman and Rumelt 1982) . Thus, in addition to the general costs of knowledge sharing-that it is time consuming and does not guarantee a positive return ex ante-knowledge sharing among competitors introduces a strategic cost: the potential loss of competitive advantage.
Even in the face of these costs, however, organization and strategy scholars have highlighted examples of firms in the same industry coming together to engage in knowledge sharing. At one end of the spectrum, similar firms that operate in different geographic markets, and that therefore compete for different consumer bases, have been found to form knowledge-sharing communities, openly sharing detailed knowledge with one another (e.g., Zuckerman and Sgourev 2006) . In this case, the loss of competitive advantage is mitigated by geographical distance, and these firms benefit from having their employees discuss and refine their strategies and best practices.
At the other end of the spectrum, knowledge sharing occurring among direct competitors has also been documented and is most common under conditions minimizing associated costs. Specifically, knowledge sharing among two competitors has been found to occur when there is a pre-existing relationship between them, when there is an expectation of direct reciprocity, or when the competitors are in a slow-moving industry (Appleyard 1996; Fauchart and von Hippel 2008; von Hippel 1987; Schrader 1991; Stein 2008) . A pre-existing relationship between those sharing fosters trust and provides a vehicle for social sanctioning, thereby reducing informational frictions (Coleman 1988; Greif 1993; Ingram and Roberts 2000; Inkpen and Tsang 2005; Stiglitz 1990 ). An expectation of direct reciprocity, or that actor A shares with actor B because A expects that B will initiate similar sharing in the future, mitigates the risk of uncertain return (Appleyard 1996; Fauchart and von Hippel 2008; von Hippel 1987; Schrader 1991; Stein 2008) . In this way, direct reciprocity helps guarantee that no single actor receives a disproportionate benefit relative to the cost they incur within a given exchange relationship (i.e., it prevents a free-rider problem). Finally, a slow-moving industry ensures the difficulty of implementing the knowledge shared, hence protecting the sharer's competitive advantage (Appleyard 1996) .
The conditions identified in extant research focus primarily on relational factors leading to knowledge sharing, helping to explain why a given dyad of competing actors would exchange knowledge. But this reasoning does not fully account for the conditions that would sustain broader, platform-based knowledge sharing among competitors where the exchange moves from actor-to-actor to actor-to-audience. For example, the Value Investing Congress (VIC) brings together value investors with the straightforward mission of "providing delegates with immediately actionable investment recommendations... [and] helping attendees acquire the wisdom they need to understand and profit in the often-irrational market" (Value Investing Congress 2014b ). An investment professional, reflecting on the conference, stated, "When I attend the [VIC] , I know that I will go home with a ton of great investment recommendations and some new ways of viewing value investing" (Value Investing Congress 2014a). Here, an investment professional can attend and gain valuable strategic insights without having a pre-existing relationship or being expected to directly reciprocate with those sharing their knowledge. This platform-level knowledge sharing is fundamentally different from that characterized and analyzed in extant research. Thus, it is unclear what conditions help motivate competitors to broadly engage in detailed knowledge sharing.
In the following, I develop a theory related to how uncertainty in the likelihood that key stakeholders will similarly identify a potential opportunity in a timely fashion helps sustain this sharing.
Knowledge Sharing among Competitors as a Response to Buyin Uncertainty
Many factors affect the likelihood that a potential opportunity, such as an idea or innovation, succeeds. However, one thing is certain: if the opportunity does not achieve a certain level of buy-in from key stakeholders-adopting it, endorsing it, or committing resources to it-it will fail. Even opportunities retrospectively noted as objectively high quality must receive this buy-in. In 1999, investment professionals noted that dot-com stocks were overvalued and that a bursting of this "bubble" was on the horizon (Brunnermeier and Nagel 2004, p. 2 here is what I term "buy-in uncertainty," the likelihood that key stakeholders will come to realize that an opportunity is not only present but also, conditional on recognizing it, that they will act on it (i.e., buy-in) in a timely fashion.
Addressing buy-in uncertainty is important for firms because they are resource constrained, namely in terms of the amount of capital and time they can invest in hopes of realizing a profit from a potential opportunity. Investment management firms-like firms in other industries-cannot often profit from an opportunity without receiving the necessary buy-in from other stakeholders. Returning to the dot-com bubble, investment management firms had the ability to short sell dot-com stocks (Geczy, Musto, and Reed 2002) , but few firms-if any-had the resources necessary to weather massive losses while they waited indefinitely for other stakeholders to agree that this opportunity was present. This buy-in uncertainty stems from the fact that most markets are imperfect: resources do not neatly flow to high-quality opportunities while avoiding low-quality opportunities along the way. This uncertainty parallels a Knightian view of uncertainty, where the expectation of an opportunity's quality is difficult to know ex ante (Knight 1921) . Although these imperfections are necessary for profitable opportunities to exist (Barney 1986; Dierickx and Cool 1989) , they introduce significant obstacles for stakeholders. Therefore, once an actor has identified a potential opportunity, they know a Keynesian Beauty Contest of sorts is occurring for stakeholders.
Specifically, Keynes (1936) explains a scenario where newspaper readers were asked to choose the six most attractive faces from a larger set, with the winner being the reader whose list was closest to the most popular choices across all readers. Keynes argues that the best strategy is a higher-order thinking approach: a reader should not choose based on their own preferences, or even in line with what they perceive the preferences of others to be, but instead based on what they expect that the average reader perceives the preferences of others to be.
This stylized example helps demonstrate the type of evaluation process that stakeholders undergo when analyzing which potential opportunities are worth their buy-in, affecting the likelihood that a profit can be realized from a given opportunity. I posit that knowledge sharing serves as a strategy to help alleviate this buy-in uncertainty by overtly focusing the attention of key stakeholders on the merits of an opportunity that they may otherwise miss.
In markets where competitors also serve as key stakeholders, the potential benefits of this knowledge sharing with competitors, when there are high levels of buy-in uncertainty for a potential opportunity, help offset the potential costs related to loss of competitive advantage from such sharing. Thus, I expect that as buy-in uncertainty for an opportunity increases, so does the likelihood that an actor shares detailed knowledge about that opportunity with their competitors.
Hypothesis: Conditional on identifying an opportunity, the likelihood that knowledge sharing among competitors occurs increases as levels of buy-in uncertainty for that opportunity increases.

Why Share with Competitors? Competitors as Key Stakeholders
Competitors often occupy a unique position as key stakeholders in their respective markets in a number of ways. First, they are able to commit resources to an opportunity, such as taking a similar position in the financial market, investing in a burgeoning technology, or even helping to legitimize an industry category. Therefore, though counterintuitive, firms may realize positive externalities from the presence of their competitors. Research has highlighted some of these positive externalities, such as common labor markets and social capital arising from the geographical agglomeration of similar firms (e.g., Krugman 1991; Saxenian 1996; Sorenson and Audia 2000) and promoting self-interest through the use of board directorates and market-governance institutions (Burris 2005; Mizruchi 1992; Yue, Luo, and Ingram 2013) . Other research has provided numerous examples of competing firms acting in a more "cooperative" fashion (e.g., Barnett and Carroll 1987; Gulati, Nohria, and Zaheer 2000; Hamel, Doz, and Prahalad 1989; Mowery, Oxley, and Silverman 1996; Navis and Glynn 2010) . These competitors are not motivated by altruism; this is a strategic choice: to maximize the rents from a potential opportunity (Teece 1986; Williamson 1991) , especially since sole ownership of knowledge may not always lead to the optimal outcome (Carter 1989 ). Navis and Glynn (2010) highlight this behavior in their analysis of the U.S. satellite radio market. They show that during the nascent period of the satellite radio market, Sirius and XM, the two major players in the market at the time, initially focused on legitimizing the broader market category. It was not until this was achieved that they began to shift their focus to between-firm differentiation.
Second, in terms of knowledge sharing, competitors offer the added benefit that they can most easily understand the knowledge being shared. Knowledge is regularly difficult to disseminate; much of it is complex and codified and therefore challenging for a non-expert to understand (Hansen 1999; Teece 1977; Zander and Kogut 1995) . Competitors have sufficient absorptive capacity to grasp complex knowledge and assess its merits when it is presented to them (cf. Cohen and Levinthal 1990) . In markets where competitors can help solve buy-in uncertainty by committing resources to an opportunity, they become an attractive set of candidates to share this knowledge with to achieve this end.
Drawing on an example from the Value Investing Congress (VIC), an event geared towards knowledge sharing among investment professionals, provides an illustration of the benefits of strategic knowledge sharing with competitors in an effort to deal with buy-in uncertainty. At the VIC in 2011, David Einhorn, founder and president of the hedge fund Greenlight Capital, announced that he had taken a short position in Green Mountain Coffee Roasters' (GMCR) stock. He then spent one hour presenting 110 slides of rigorous analysis that supported this opportunity. To this point, between the end of 2010 and Einhorn's presentation, GMCR's value had been consistently increasing, with its stock price nearly tripling. Although Einhorn had identified a market opportunity that he was confident in, as evidenced by his firm's substantial investment in the opportunity, there was considerable buy-in uncertainty for this opportunity; specifically, it was unclear if others in the market would similarly recognize this opportunity in a timely fashion. However, during his presentation the stock price began to rapidly decrease and GMCR had lost about 10 percent of its total value that day (Comstock 2011 ). In line with my theory, Einhorn engaged in knowledge sharing with other investment professionals (i.e., key stakeholders in the industry) to convince them that an opportunity was present, and in doing so, he was able to successfully achieve buy-in. While effective, Einhorn's approach was not overly original. Researchers have long noted that there are benefits from getting the word out about an investment opportunity you have invested in (Dow and Gorton 1994; Crawford, Gray, and Kern 2017; Ljungqvist and Qian 2016; Zuckerman 2012a, pp. 235-236) . Furthermore, investment professionals have used "idea dinners," where a small group of friends get together to discuss investment opportunities with one another, for years (Anderson 2005 )-although unlike the VIC, these are closer to the dyadic knowledge sharing based on existing relationships and norms of reciprocity.
The benefits derived from engaging in knowledge sharing with competitors to address the buy-in uncertainty are not unique to financial markets. In 2014, Tesla Motors announced that it "will not initiate patent lawsuits against anyone who, in good faith, wants to use our technology" (Tesla Motors 2014). This was a marked difference from Tesla's knowledge strategy before that point: by 2014 Tesla had amassed more than 1,400 patents (Voyles 2014b) . Initially, Tesla's broad knowledge sharing with its competitors was seen as a "strategic error" and some predicted that Tesla "would suffer as a result" (Voyles 2014b ). However, similar to the Einhorn example, Tesla realized a benefit from this knowledge sharing. At the time, Tesla was facing high levels of buy-in uncertainty; it was unclear if key stakeholders saw their innovations as legitimate. Soon after this announcement, discussions of strategic partnerships between Tesla and its competitors began (Kaufman 2014; Voyles 2014a ) and Tesla's stock price increased (Voyles 2014b) . By engaging in this knowledge sharing, Tesla motivated competitors to buy-in to this potential opportunity.
Overall, these examples and extant work may lead one to predict that broad knowledge sharing with key stakeholders, such as competitors, should always follow the identification of and investment in a potential opportunity. However, given the potential costs of knowledge sharing, such as a potential loss of competitive advantage, the core contribution of this theory is understanding the conditions under which knowledge sharing is more likely to occur, specifically, how buy-in uncertainty motivates knowledge sharing among competitors.
Using a Digital Platform for Knowledge Sharing
A risk of moving competitive knowledge sharing from the dyad, as categorized in extant competitive knowledge sharing research, to a digital platform is that the potential loss of competitive advantage magnifies. However, a digital platform provides significant benefits for knowledge sharing that help offset these risks. A main advantage of engaging in knowledge sharing through a digital platform is capitalizing on the network effects commonly associated with such platforms (Evans 2003; Gawer 2011 Gawer , 2014 Rochet and Tirole 2006) . After a critical mass of participants is active on the platform, the knowledge sharer benefits from disseminating their knowledge to a wider audience. Given the posited motivation of buy-in uncertainty, this helps increase the likelihood that enough stakeholders similarly recognize an opportunity's potential. For the knowledge seeker, organizing via a digital platform offers the benefit of being exposed to a larger set of opportunities to assess in terms of their worthiness of the knowledge seeker's resources.
A second advantage is that digital platforms remove frictions often prohibiting in-person community-based organizing, namely time and space. Virtually connecting allows actors from across the globe and different positions within the social hierarchy to come together.
We would expect the diversity of information that one is exposed to on such a digital platform to be greater than information received in person, from colleagues and friends, who are more likely to possess redundant information (Burt 1995; Hansen 1999; McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001; Reagans and Zuckerman 2008) . Further, bringing together competitors helps ensure that these actors have a similar expertise, which has been shown to help the flow of knowledge and to decrease reliance on individual-level characteristics (Hwang, Singh, and Argote 2015) .
Empirical Context
The setting for this research was the Real Investors Club (RIC, a pseudonym), a private digital platform that brings together buy-side (e.g., hedge fund, mutual fund) investment The investment recommendations submitted on RIC focus on identifying current market opportunities rather than on discussing the success or lack thereof of previous opportunities.
When an investment professional submits a recommendation for a stock, they must include certain basic information: a recommendation; a price target, the price they expect the stock to reach; and an investment horizon, the estimated time for this price target to be reached (e.g., one year). They must also include a justification for this recommendation, which is visible to all current and future investment professionals on the platform. The accompanying justification can be detailed, thoroughly discussing the analysis leading to the recommendation, at least 600 words long (averaging over 1,400 words), or simple, a statement supporting the recommendation, at most 40 words long (averaging 24 words). The content included in a detailed justification is monitored by RIC to ensure a minimal level of quality and rigor, whereas the content of the simple justification is not strictly monitored, other than the 40-word limit.
To supplement the data from RIC, I conducted 21 semi-structured interviews with investment professionals, 12 of whom were members of RIC. These interviews provided moredetailed information about the investment industry and the platform. When asked what led them to join RIC or another knowledge-sharing platform in the industry, interviewees almost always said that they wished to be part of a community of professional value investors. This elucidates their desire to have a broad audience with which to share their opportunities and knowledge. Interviewees also expressed gratitude to the community, stating that the investment recommendations on the platform affected their own view of their portfolio and their investment strategy, and that the feedback they received on their recommendations helped them hone their skills. Investment professionals noted that they discussed their desire to join a knowledge-sharing platform with their firm's leadership, suggesting that this was a firm-level decision.
Those interviewed who were not part of at least one knowledge-sharing platform gave two common reasons for their lack of participation. First, some specified that their firm did not allow the analysis that led to their investments to be shared outside the firm (i.e., the content of a detailed justification). A Director of Research stated that it was important to his firm to keep this type of information away from competing firms. Similarly, one investment professional stated that they had to discontinue their use of knowledge-sharing platforms when they changed employers. Second, some investment professionals viewed their knowledge as too valuable to share. For example, a portfolio manager at a mutual fund specified that he would not want to advance someone else's career by allowing them to use his analysis. However, similar to those surveyed by Shiller and Pound (1989) , these investment professionals stated that they engaged in knowledge sharing with a select few friends (i.e., pre-existing ties), where direct reciprocity was expected (see also Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy 2008; Duflo and Saez 2002, 2003; Hong, Kubik, and Stein 2004, 2005) . This type of relational knowledge sharing is also consistent with extant research documenting knowledge sharing among competitors more broadly (Appleyard 1996; Fauchart and von Hippel 2008; von Hippel 1987; Ingram and Roberts 2000; Schrader 1991) . One analyst described that he preferred to share his "homework" (analysis) one-on-one only, and the idea of others incorporating his investment process into theirs kept him from joining such platforms.
Data
The data for this study were all submitted investment recommendations for common stockas opposed to debt or options-listed on a U.S. exchange (e.g., NASDAQ and NYSE) between To be included in the sample, the CRSP database had to cover the stock being recommended at least on the day before the recommendation was submitted. CRSP covers major U.S. exchanges, therefore, it does not include data on stocks that trade via the Over-theCounter (OTC) Bulletin Board. Most of the stocks on the OTC Bulletin Board are "penny stocks," which are characterized by their volatility and a lack of scrutiny by key evaluative institutions in the market (see Ang, Shtauber, and Tetlock 1989 , for a discussion), resulting in a more conservative sample given the goals of this study.
Measuring Knowledge Sharing
The main dependent variable in this study was the indicator variable Knowledge Sharing, which took the value of 1 for an investment recommendation submitted with a detailed justification and 0 if a simple justification was used. While some information is being shared in simple justifications, it stands in stark contrast to the knowledge included in detailed justifications ( Figure 1a and Figure 1b) . Simple justifications are limited to 40 words, and average only 24 words, which severely constrains the ability to convey any meaningful knowledge about a given opportunity. Moreover, these simple justifications offer tenuous insight into the analysis, a key source of competitive advantage, which led to the specific recommendation ( Figure 1a ). It could be argued that gauging another investment professional's absolute sentiment about a stock (buy vs. sell) is useful; however, much these data are publicly available.
For example, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires all mutual funds to report their complete list of holdings each quarter (through forms N-Q and N-CSR), and the SEC requires other institutional investors (e.g., hedge funds) with more than $100 million in equity assets under management to report their holdings quarterly via Form 13F.
[ To further elucidate why a detailed justification represents knowledge sharing and a simple justification does not, let us return to the portfolio manager from above who refused to share knowledge because he did not want someone else using his analysis. He was not opposed to others knowing the stocks he was invested in-his portfolio is a matter of public record (his firm publicly published their investment positions). What he wished to safeguard was the analysis that led to his identifying a given market opportunity-the knowledge contained in a detailed justification. When asked about the differences between using the simple and the detailed justifications, an investment professional said, "I see them as two completely different vehicles; [the detailed justification] lets me fix the market by sharing my due diligence with the community while [the simple justification] lets me make a call." The "fix[ing]" of the market speaks directly to the strategic use of knowledge sharing: an investment professional who finds an opportunity but who faces high levels of buy-in uncertainty is motivated to share knowledge with competitors to combat this uncertainty and help increase the likelihood that their opportunity receives buy-in. This "fix[ing]" reflects the investment professional's belief that they have identified a market opportunity rather than a desire to make the market efficient. The motivation for using a simple justification was less clear. Those who were interviewed agreed with the above quote, regarding simple justifications as making a call. In other words, they valued being able to prove that they had identified an opportunity. This suggests that investment professionals used simple justifications when they perceived lower levels of buy-in uncertainty about a given opportunity. Importantly, the platform does not guide investment professionals to use one type of justification over another-members are free to do as they please.
Therefore, a detailed justification, relative to a simple justification, offers a rigorous level of both qualitative and quantitative knowledge. Interviewees often mentioned that these justifications took months to research and hours to create. Further, one investment professional stated that the detailed justifications he submitted to RIC were identical to the proposals he submitted internally to his portfolio manager. Together, all of these factors indicate that the knowledge included in a detailed justification is much closer to firm-level strategic knowledge (Grant 1996; Levitt and March 1988 ).
An alternative explanation to the hypothesized relationship between knowledge sharing and buy-in uncertainty is that those using the simple justification are simply free riding.
Specifically, investment professionals want access to other investment professionals' analyses; therefore, they submit a recommendation with a simple justification to gain access to the full database of recommendations using a detailed justification. However, this type of free riding is not possible on RIC. To gain access to the database of recommendations with detailed justifications, one must actively contribute such recommendations. Further, as mentioned above, RIC checks the quality of detailed justifications to help ensure that investment professionals are not submitting low-quality analyses, therefore, safeguarding against recommendations that may be submitted in order to gain access to the analysis of others.
The ability to leverage variation in knowledge sharing within the same context is im-portant methodologically. Previous research has often focused on cases where knowledge sharing occurred and then highlighted the conditions present in those instances, or relied on self-reports of knowledge-sharing activities (e.g., Appleyard 1996; Fauchart and von Hippel 2008; von Hippel 1987; Ingram and Roberts 2000; Schrader 1991) . While this research has shed important light on the phenomenon of knowledge sharing among competitors, this method of analysis introduces the possibility of measurement error. My context, in contrast, provides a unique opportunity to isolate the conditions leading investment professionals to share knowledge through recommendations with detailed justification by comparing these instances to an appropriate baseline: simple justifications where knowledge is not being shared (see Fernandez and Sosa 2005 , for a similar discussion related to labor market research).
Measuring Buy-in Uncertainty
Buy-in uncertainty is the likelihood that key stakeholders will come to realize the value of a potential opportunity in a timely fashion. In this context, an opportunity is when an investment professional perceives a stock to be underpriced (overpriced): the current price of the stock is less (greater) than its current value. Although buy-in uncertainty plays a role in most markets, the financial market context offers a chance to measure it more easily. If an investment professional finds an opportunity, it is not the case that they can just buy (or sell) that stock; they need others in the market to similarly realize that this opportunity is present, or to buy-in (Zajac and Westphal 2004; Zuckerman 2012b) . Buy-in uncertainty was captured using multiple measures related to the level of scrutiny and attention that a firm faced from key evaluative institutions in the market, which has been shown to affect the price-value relationship for a stock (Boehmer and Kelley 2009; Fang and Peress 2009; Zhang 2006 and Media Attention were used to capture the level of buy-in uncertainty for a given stock.
The goal of this approach is to not overemphasize the coefficient of any one measure but instead to interpret the results collectively.
Firm Age was calculated as the difference between the year the investment recommendation was submitted and the initial year the stock was covered in the CRSP database (most often the firm's IPO year), plus 1. Firm Age approximates the availability of historical data-an overall sense of information availability-for a firm. As time passes there is more information and certainty about a firm's strategy, leadership, and performance. Addi-tionally, given that these are public firms, "older" firms have also submitted more financial documentation (e.g., quarterly reports) to the SEC that has been scrutinized and evaluated.
Sell-Side Coverage was calculated as the sum of the number of unique earnings estimates for the stock featured in the investment recommendation, in each of the four quarters prior to that recommendation. When a firm becomes publicly traded on a U.S. exchange, sellside analysts may choose to initiate coverage of the firm. These evaluators have been found to wield influence with the firm they cover, even affecting a firm's management practices (e.g., Benner and Ranganathan 2012; Rao and Sivakumar 1999; Zuckerman 2000) . Sellside analysts will issue periodic reports about the firm. These reports routinely include an evaluation of historical information, industry outlooks, and earnings estimates, as well as other analyses. As this coverage increases, so does the scrutiny and evaluation of the firm, and information about the firm reaches a wider audience. Greater coverage has been found to be directly related to a firm's information availability and to increases in price for underpriced stocks (e.g., Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith 2005; Bushman and Smith 2001; Francis, Douglas Hanna, and Philbrick 1997; Lang and Lundholm 1996) , and this increased level of scrutiny and evaluation leads to beneficial outcomes in terms of corporate governance (Yu 2008) . For this measure, if three unique analysts covered a stock in each of the last four quarters (3 × 4 = 12), and two other analysts covered the stock, but for only two of the last four quarters (2 × 2 = 4), Sell-Side Coverage would take the value of 16 (12 + 4). If estimates were updated within a given quarter, Sell-Side Coverage was not changed.
Institutional ownership was calculated as the ratio of the number of shares of a firm's stock owned by institutional investors that file Form 13F to the total number of shares outstanding. Institutional investors may include banks, hedge funds, mutual funds, pensions, and endowments. These are investment professionals who manage money for their clients. Given their large pool of capital for investment, institutional investors can take large investment positions in a firm, which gives them substantial influence over management practices, such as aligning compensation with shareholder expectations (e.g., Connelly et al. 2010; Parthiban, Kochhar, and Levitas 1998) and promoting long-term innovation efforts (e.g., Kochhar and Parthiban 1998) Media Attention was measured as the number of articles in which a firm was discussed in the month preceding the investment recommendation, plus 1. These counts were handcollected from a leading website focused on financial markets that aggregates and publishes news about stocks. A greater amount of media attention implies that a firm faces a higher level of scrutiny and attention. Similarly, media attention has been found to affect a firm's stock price, even when no genuine news is supplied (Fang and Peress 2009 ). Further, substantial (even unrelated) media attention in a previous period has been found to attenuate the effect of negative future events, such as protests, on stock returns (King and Soule 2007) .
For these measures, besides the institutional ownership concentration variables, buy-in uncertainty decreases as the value of these measures increases. Therefore, buy-in uncertainty is maximized when the value of these measures, X, is minimized. For consistency with the 2. There are instances in which institutional ownership is reported as exceeding 100 percent. As discussed by Asquith and colleagues (2005) , there are legitimate reasons for this occurring. In this sample, institutional ownership was capped at 100 percent. Results are robust to the removal of these observations. hypothesized relationship, the reciprocal of these measures, (1/X), was used. To more concretely illustrate this transformation, consider the variable Firm Age. During a firm's first year, Firm Age is equal to 1 (0 + 1), with its reciprocal being 1/1, and after four more years Firm Age for this same firm is equal to 5 (4 + 1), with its reciprocal being 1/5. Since buy-in uncertainty should be higher, ceteris paribus, for smaller values of Firm Age, we would expect the values of Firm Age used in the analyses to correspond to this notion, that is, 1/1 > 1/5.
Control Variables
Variables at the investment-professional and investment-recommendation level were used as controls. At the investment-professional level, these measures included education, using a ranking of both undergraduate and graduate institution, and the investment professional's physical location. At the investment-recommendation level, investment horizon, firm size, industry fixed effects, and year fixed effects were included.
For undergraduate education, the 2013 U.S. News College Ranking (U.S. News and World
Report 2014b) was used to match an investment professional's undergraduate institution to its ranking. This was also done for graduate education. For U.S. business schools, the 2013 U.S. News MBA Ranking was used (U.S. News and World Report 2014a), and for non-U.S. business schools, the 2013 Financial Times Global MBA Ranking (Financial Times 2014) was used. Investment professionals' education was grouped into two variables, Elite Undergraduate and Elite Graduate, if they attended a school ranked 1 − 20, respectively. Education quality was controlled for because certain institutions may train investment professionals to act in a certain way with regard to sharing knowledge. Given that an investment professional's city has been found to affect their investment choices (e.g., Hong, Lim, and Stein 2000) and available resources, location was included as a control. Major City represents large metropolitan cities in the U.S. that are often thought of as financial hubs (e.g., Boston, Chicago, New York City, and San Francisco) and took the value of 1 for all investment professionals working in these cities. Additionally, the indicator variable Non-US took the value of 1 for all investment professionals located in a city outside the U.S. At the investment-recommendation level, certain firm sizes, investment horizons, industries, or time periods may be more suitable for knowledge sharing. Firm Size was calculated as the market capitalization (share price × shares outstanding) of the stock featured in the investment recommendation (in billions) on the day prior to the recommendation being sub-mitted, using the shares outstanding reported in the previous quarter. Although firm size may be correlated with the level of scrutiny and attention that a firm receives, it also captures many other factors, making it a necessary control in all models. Similar to the above reasoning, the reciprocal of Firm Size was used in the analyses. An investment professional's investment horizon may affect their likelihood to share knowledge; therefore, the indicator variable for recommendations of Short Investment Horizon took the value of 1 if the investment professional has an investment horizon of under one year. Table 1 
Empirical Model
I estimated the following logit regression to evaluate the main hypothesis:
where i indexes the investment recommendation, the unit of analysis. X i is a vector of recommender-and recommendation-level controls; δ i is a fixed effect for the industry of the stock being recommended and includes 24 two-digit North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) sectors, and an indicator for a missing NAICS sector; and λ i is a fixed effect for the year the recommendation was submitted. Robust standard errors were clustered at the investment-professional level given the possibility that the choice of sharing knowledge and of which types of stock to recommend may be correlated within investment professional.
Results
Buy-in Uncertainty and Likelihood of Knowledge Sharing
Figure 2 presents initial descriptive evidence that investment professionals were more likely to share knowledge (i.e., use a detailed justification) when recommending stocks that were more likely to have higher levels of buy-in uncertainty (i.e., smaller firms). The average market capitalization of a stock recommended with a detailed justification was approximately $6.8 billion, almost one-third the size of the average market capitalization of the stocks listed on the Standard & Poor's 500 (S&P 500; $19.1 billion, at the midpoint of the period under study). Because this context includes both the simple and detailed justification, I am able to distinguish between my hypothesized explanation, that investment professionals share knowledge in response to high levels of buy-in uncertainty, and the alternative explanation that investment professionals who share knowledge are more likely to prefer stocks with higher levels of buy-in uncertainty. Comparing the market capitalization of the firms discussed across the two justification types-detailed and simple-begins to adjudicate between these alternatives. From Figure 2 , it is evident that there is a strong correlation between a firm's size and the likelihood that knowledge sharing occured. The average market capitalization of stocks recommended with a simple justification was about $18.4 billion, similar to that of the S&P 500, and 2.7 times larger than that of stocks recommended with a detailed justification (p < 0.001).
[ Similarly, the coefficient of Firm Age (Table 3, M3) suggests that an investment recommendation for a firm's stock that more recently IPO'ed was more likely to include a detailed justification than a recommendation for a stock that had been public for several years. Similarly, the odds of knowledge sharing were 42 percent higher when a firm received the mean (1.65) amount of media attention than when a firm received media attention that was one standard deviation (7.18) above the mean (Table 3, (Table 3, M5 ). The log odds of knowledge sharing were higher when there was a greater concentration of ownership among five or fewer institutional investors for a given stock. This effect was moderated as concentration increased outside this small set of institutional investors, Investor Concentration (Percent, Other), meaning institutional ownership was more dispersed. Overall, these results offer strong empirical support for the main hypothesis: that, conditional on identifying an opportunity, an investment professional is more likely to share knowledge with their competitors when an opportunity they have identified has higher levels of buy-in uncertainty. Figure 3 presents the marginal effects from the regressions in Table 3 .
[ Table 3 ]
In subsequent analyses, I introduced the measure Short Recommendation to the above models. Short Recommendation is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if the investment recommendation was to short sell the stock and a value of 0 if the recommendation was to buy-and-hold the stock. Short selling is a feature of the U.S. stock market, and its presence offers a unique empirical opportunity to further test the main hypothesis, because the costs of not achieving buy-in are much greater for a short selling opportunity (see the dot-com bubble discussion above) than for a buy-and-hold opportunity. Short selling allows an investor who is pessimistic about the current price of a given stock (i.e., believes it to be overvalued) to borrow shares of a stock that they do not own, for a fee, and sell them back to the market. The investor agrees to return the shares at a later date, along with interest, and any distributions (e.g., dividends) that occur during the borrowing period. A short seller profits when a stock price decreases relative to when they borrowed the shares. While the availability of short selling is an important mechanism for an efficient market (Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter 2005; Curtis and Fargher 2014) , it is frequently criticized because the need for buy-in is especially high relative to buying a stock (Abreu and Brunnermeier 2003; Brunnermeier and Nagel 2004; Zuckerman 2012b) . Unlike when buying a stock, an investor who short sells a stock does not own part of the firm and faces the possibility of unbounded loss-there is no limit on the upward movement of a stock's price.
Following from the main hypothesis, we would expect that the high level of buy-in uncertainty surrounding short selling makes it more likely that these recommendations include knowledge sharing relative to buy-and-hold recommendations. The evidence across all model specifications (Table 4) supports this relationship; the log odds of knowledge sharing are significantly higher for short-selling recommendations than for buy-and-hold recommendations.
On average, the odds that an investment professional engaged in knowledge sharing about an investment opportunity are between 1.675 (exp[0.516]) to 1.802 (exp[0.589]) times higher when a recommendation was to short sell a stock relative to buy-and-hold a stock.
[ Table 4 ] Overall, I find strong evidence that competitors incur the costs of knowledge sharing as buy-in uncertainty increases for an investment opportunity they have identified.
Robustness Checks
A possible alternative explanation is that these investment professionals needed to provide more detail for the firms facing a lower level of scrutiny and attention from key evaluative institutions in the market because such firms are obscure and insignificant in the economy.
While this does not invalidate the main hypothesis, it is worth addressing. An initial safeguard against this concern is that the data exclude stocks that trade via the OTC Bulletin Board, or "penny stocks." Further, although on average investment recommendations with a detailed justifications feature smaller firms, these are still substantial firms in the economy.
The average market capitalization of firms featured in a detailed justification is $6.8 billion a potential opportunity they have identified in an effort to motivate other stakeholders to buy in, thereby increasing the likelihood that the opportunity will yield a profit. Conversely, opportunities still exist when there are lower levels of buy-in uncertainty; however, other stakeholders are more likely to organically realize these opportunities in a timely fashion, making it less likely that investment professionals opt to incur the costs associated with knowledge sharing for those potential opportunities.
There are also important challenges related to selection that must be addressed. While simple justifications present an important baseline for analysis, it is still possible that selection into knowledge sharing is affecting the above results. For example, it is possible that buy-in uncertainty is correlated with a certain type of investment professional or that the above results are driven by unobserved investment-professional heterogeneity, such as differences in their prior training or career motivations. To address this concern, I identified investment professionals who submitted at least one investment recommendation with a detailed justification and at least one recommendation with a simple justification. Individual fixed effects were then included in all models, allowing for a within-investment-professional analysis. The analyses presented in Table 3 were replicated in Table 5 and the analyses presented in Table 4 were replicated in Table 6 . These results are robust, with evidence still strongly suggesting that investment professionals are more likely to bear the costs of knowledge sharing with their competitors when there are high levels of buy-in uncertainty surrounding an investment opportunity.
A "spaghetti against the wall" or feedback alternative may also be at play in the context. Investment professionals may share knowledge about many investment opportunities in order to gauge the response from these key stakeholders. They could then commit their firm's capital to the opportunities that were seen as most favorable. First and foremost, the overwhelming majority of investment professionals on RIC are value oriented, so such a scheme seems unlikely. Supporting this counterargument, the average investment professional only shares knowledge about two to three investment opportunities during their tenure. If this alternative was true, I would expect this to be a much larger number. To rule out this alternative more rigorously, I was able to collect data on whether the firm the investment professional submitting an investment recommendation works for had taken a position in the stock prior to the recommendation occurring. I find that firms had taken a position prior to the recommendation in an overwhelming proportion of cases (81 percent 4 ) helping rule out a feedback alternative. This statistic also provides further evidence of the posited mechanism of buy-in uncertainty. These investment professionals are sharing knowledge after they have committed to the opportunity.
[ Table 5] [ Table 6] Another alternative explanation for engaging in knowledge sharing relates to career stage.
Junior investment professionals may be motivated to establish a reputation, namely a track record of outperformance, apart from their firm. An initial counterargument to this alternative is that these investment professionals could build their reputation by submitting recommendations with a simple justification, which would allow them to have a history of their performance. Empirically, Table 5 and Table 6 include investment professional and year fixed effects, helping rule out that investment professionals are changing their own sharing behavior over time, however, it is possible that many investment professionals stay on the platform for a shorter period of time and thus the use of these fixed effects may not fully address this career stage alternative.
To address this, I was able to collect title information for 739 investment professionals in my sample. This accounted for 5,187 recommendations (27 percent) of the sample, 40 percent of which included knowledge sharing. I coded the titles analyst and associate as junior and the title portfolio manager, as well as executive titles (e.g., Founder, CIO), as senior, using the dichotomous variable Senior Investment Professional. 5 To first test the validity of this coding scheme, I analyzed the likelihood that the investment professional's firm had a position in the stock before it was recommended as a function of their seniority. We should expect firms to be more likely to commit firm resources to the investment recommendations of senior members of the firm, relative to more junior members of the firm. I find that for recommendations made by senior investment professionals their firm took a position in that security 90 percent of the time as compared to 77 percent for recommendations made by junior investment professionals (p < 0.001), which helps validate this dichotomous measure. I then regressed the likelihood of sharing knowledge on the investment professional seniority. Counter to a career stage alternative, I found that there is a positive correlation between being senior and sharing knowledge but this relationship is not statistically significant (Table 7, R9) . Furthermore, I find evidence that junior and senior investment professionals are similarly more likely to engage in knowledge sharing as buy-in uncertainty increases (Table 7 , R10-R13). Therefore, it is unlikely that an alternative explanation regarding career mobility is driving knowledge sharing in this context.
[ Table 7 ]
Does Knowledge Sharing Lead to Buy-in?
The evidence presented thus far strongly suggests that knowledge sharing among competitors is most likely when a potential opportunity faces high levels of buy-in uncertainty. It is next important to understand whether this goal is achieved. In other words, in order for organizations to consider this knowledge strategy, it would be beneficial to know whether knowledge sharing leads to buy-in in my context. To answer this question, I collected stock return data around the time an investment opportunity was recommended to analyze how stock return changes in the period right before and after knowledge sharing occurs. The dependent variable in this analysis is the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of a stock recommended using knowledge sharing, a common methodology for assessing whether an event (here, knowledge sharing) affects a stock's price to a greater degree than the market would predict (e.g., Brown and Warner 1985; King and Soule 2007; Zajac and Westphal 2004) .
For each stock i featured in a recommendation with knowledge sharing (a detailed justification), I calculated its abnormal returns (AR):
where AR it is the abnormal return for stock i in period t, R it is the actual return of stock i in period t, and E(R it ) is the expected return for stock i in period t. I estimated this expected return using an ordinary least squares regression of stock i's return on the market's return (R mt ), here, the value weighted index of all stocks in the CRSP database:
where α i is the intercept term of the regression (stock i's return when R mt is 0, comparable to the risk-free rate) and β i is a constant term from the regression (the systematic risk, or beta, of stock i). The CAR is then the sum of stock i's abnormal returns over an event window (t to T ):
I defined the event window as 21 days (-10, 10), the 10 days prior to the submission of a detailed justification for a stock to the 10 days after, with the day of submission being day 0. The regression coefficients for expected return were estimated using a 239-day window, prior to the start of the event window (King and Soule 2007; Zajac and Westphal 2004) . I find that the cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) is positively correlated with the investment recommendation around the time the recommendation with knowledge sharing occurs: for buy-and-hold recommendations the CAAR is +1.19 percent (p < 0.001) and for short-sell recommendations the CAAR is -4.19 percent (p < 0.001). Figure 4 plots the CAAR for the event window, where a sharp change in CAAR can be seen around the day that the recommendation is submitted. These results are robust to use of other specifications for the event window, including an immediate window around the knowledge-sharing event (-1, 1). Using this specification, the CAAR for buy-and-hold recommendations is +0.43 percent (p < 0.001) and the CAAR for short-sell recommendations is -1.24 percent (p < 0.001).
These patterns strongly suggest that submitting a recommendation with detailed knowledge sharing leads to buy-in from key stakeholders.
This finding is also in line with comments from investment professionals that I interviewed who referred to RIC as a resource to source investment opportunities for their fund.
One hedge fund founder discussed that though he managed a significant amount of capital, his team was small, and thus his firm often used RIC as a resource for beginning their due diligence process. Furthermore, for recommendations submitted with a detailed justification, RIC members can provide free-form comments. Although a systematic analysis was not undertaken, most of the commentary were questions that helped clarify the submitted knowledge, which suggests that opportunity seekers are trying to further analyze the quality of an opportunity.
[ Figure 4 ] These results, in sum, show that investment professionals on RIC were more likely to engage in knowledge sharing when there were high levels of buy-in uncertainty surrounding an investment opportunity they have identified. Further evidence suggests that, on average, this knowledge sharing did lead to the investment opportunity receiving buy-in.
Discussion
Given the integral role of knowledge in affecting firm outcomes (Argote 2012 (Argote , 2012 Hansen 2002; Reagans and McEvily 2008; Zander and Kogut 1995) , firms take their knowledge strategy seriously (Brown and Duguid 2001; Zack 1999) . In fact, firms are increasingly using a new organizational form to improve their knowledge-sharing effort within their firm, namely digital platforms (Hwang, Singh, and Argote 2015; McKinsey & Company 2013) . Firms have embraced these digital platforms because they mimic the benefits of in-person communication, such as communities of practice (Wenger 1998; Wenger, McDermott, and Snyder 2002) , while removing many of the related frictions, such as time and space constraints. When we consider the promise of these platforms for promoting knowledge sharing across firms, prima facie the prospects are much dimmer. Extant research would lead us to believe that such broad sharing would only magnify the costs of knowledge sharing among competitors, specifically loss of competitive advantage (Appleyard 1996; Fauchart and von Hippel 2008; von Hippel 1987; Schrader 1991) . This research has primarily highlighted that knowledge sharing among competitors is most likely through relational mechanisms, such as pre-existing relationships and expectations of direct reciprocity, where this cost is best minimized. However, there are cases in the economy of competitors broadly sharing knowledge with one another that cannot be explained by these relational mechanisms. In this paper, I develop a theory that helps reconcile this disconnect and deepen our understanding of the conditions under which knowledge sharing among competitors can be sustained. To test my theory, I use data from a digital knowledge-sharing platform that brings investment professionals together from around the globe.
This study contributes to research on knowledge sharing among competitors (Appleyard 1996; Fauchart and von Hippel 2008; von Hippel 1987; Schrader 1991) by uncovering how a new broader mechanism-which I call "buy-in uncertainty"-motivates competitors to engage in broader knowledge sharing with one another. It seems intuitive that actors are primarily concerned with discovering an objectively high-quality opportunity; in most markets, however, it is difficult to discern objective quality. Instead, a significant factor predicting an opportunity's success is whether key stakeholders come to realize that a potential opportunity is valuable and subsequently buy in, by adopting, endorsing, or committing resources to it. I show that in markets where competitors are a set of key stakeholders, knowledge sharing serves as a strategic response to this buy-in uncertainty with the aim of focusing stakeholder attention on a potential opportunity that has been found. In these cases, the costs associated with knowledge sharing among competitors are offset by the benefits of potentially gaining the necessary buy-in. By virtually connecting individuals from around the globe, digital platforms provide a medium for achieving this buy-in.
Importantly, this buy-in uncertainty mechanism does not refute the relational mechanisms discussed in previous work. As highlighted above, interviewees reported that they often share knowledge among a small group, often before submitting the recommendation to RIC. The existence of these "idea dinners," which are "smaller [and] intimate," in the investment management industry has been highlighted for some time (Anderson 2005) . My interviews suggest that this relational knowledge sharing was motivated more by receiving feedback than by gaining buy-in. It is also possible that experience with dyadic knowledge sharing increases the likelihood that a firm would allow their employees to share knowledge more broadly, via a digital platform. This provides an opportunity for future research to adjudicate how the main goal of knowledge sharing in a particular instance, namely for feedback versus buy-in, leads to different knowledge strategies, as well as how relational mechanisms complement the market-based mechanism found in this research.
Relatedly, this research also contributes to the body of research showing instances of competitors acting more "cooperatively" in a competitive environment (e.g., Barnett and Carroll 1987; Gulati, Nohria, and Zaheer 2000; Hamel, Doz, and Prahalad 1989; Mowery, Oxley, and Silverman 1996; Navis and Glynn 2010) , by uncovering an additional positive externality (e.g., Barnett and Carroll 1987; Burris 2005; Krugman 1991; Mizruchi 1992; Navis and Glynn 2010; Sorenson and Audia 2000; Yue, Luo, and Ingram 2013) . Specifically, competitors are often key stakeholders in their market and therefore occupy a unique position.
They can both easily interpret complex knowledge and judge its quality; furthermore, they have the resources to commit to an opportunity and provide the necessary buy-in. Therefore, in contexts where a first-mover advantage can be secured, I show that knowledge sharing can be seen as a type of "cooperation"-a strategic response to high levels of buy-in uncertainty. A subsequent question is: why do these competitors buy in? This is not a case of altruism, and if the competitor had nothing to gain they would not buy in. Instead, this behavior can best be explained by the aphorism "a rising tide lifts all boats." While buy-in will most benefit the firm that discovered the opportunity, firms that buy in soon after will also extract profit from the opportunity, without expending the cost of discovering it.
This study also contributes to research on online communities that has focused on the motivations for participating on digital platforms more generally (e.g., Bagozzi and Dholakia 2006; Constant, Sproull, and Kiesler 1996; Hwang, Singh, and Argote 2015; Kollock 1999; Lakhani and von Hippel 2003; Lerner and Tirole 2002; Mizruchi 1992; Wasko and Faraj 2005) . Previous work has highlighted individual-level motivations for sharing knowledge via professional-typed digital platforms, such as reputation building by offering high-quality feedback, and reciprocity by paying the community back for feedback they have received.
Although these individual-level motivations surely play a role in an actor's decision to join a knowledge-sharing platform, they are insufficient for explaining the relationship between knowledge sharing and buy-in uncertainty in my context. For example, I do not find evidence that career stage affects knowledge sharing (Table 7) . Therefore, this study offers insight about how a market-based mechanism can also motivate the existence of knowledge sharing through a digital platform. A promising avenue for future work relates to how marketbased mechanisms, such as buy-in uncertainty, help sustain the emergence of other, more recent, digital platforms, such as crowdfunding, whose aim is to help those who have found a potential opportunity. Often, opportunities featured on crowdfunding platforms are at an early stage when buy-in uncertainty is extremely high. Future work may look at how this motivates participation in crowdfunding and how it affects key outcomes, such as funds raised. Further, the need for buy-in may also be a mechanism that affects the likelihood that employees participate in digital knowledge-sharing platforms within the firm. Employees may hesitate to widely share an idea to protect their ability to capitalize on receiving credit; thus, certain ideas, where buy-in is especially needed, may motivate employees to share more broadly within their firm.
Finally, outside of research on knowledge sharing and digital platforms, this study will be of interest to scholars who have showed that market efficiency cannot be taken as a given (Beunza, Hardie, and MacKenzie 2006; MacKenzie and Millo 2003; Turco and Zuckerman 2014; Zuckerman 2012b) . The need to engage in knowledge sharing in a financial market context stands in direct contrast to the expectations of neoclassical finance (cf. Shiller and Pound 1989) and the efficient-market hypothesis (EMH; Fama 1965 Fama , 1970 . The EMH sets the expectation that buy-in uncertainty will not be a prevalent issue in the financial markets. My findings, however, show that a lack of scrutiny and attention from key evaluative institutions in the market increases the odds of sharing knowledge about these investment opportunities.
This research underscores the fact that, like most other markets, financial markets are not immune to missing an opportunity and that this organizational form may be a means by which a more efficient market is achieved.
While this study explains knowledge sharing in a substantive economic market, the financial market, it is important to highlight key scope conditions. The theory outlined above assumes that the market in question is one where actors are resource constrained; in other words, they cannot solve buy-in uncertainty by themselves. Furthermore, actors must be able to reasonably secure a first-mover advantage, and the shared knowledge cannot perfectly replicate their competitive advantage, such as sharing one's algorithm or formula.
Another scope condition relates to the fact that a competitor's role as a key stakeholder is not easily substitutable with a non-competing alternative. However, even in markets where these non-competing substitutes exist, there are still risks in engaging in knowledge sharing.
For example, non-competing firms may transfer shared knowledge to one's competitor. Relatedly, an important limitation of these data is that all investment professionals under study selected into joining the platform, as opposed to the entire universe of investment professionals. To gain access to the platform, these investment professionals have shared at least one investment recommendation to buy or short sell a stock using at least a simple justification.
Although submitting recommendations solely using simple justifications does not constitute the detailed knowledge sharing of interest, as aforementioned, investment professionals opting into this platform may differ from investment professionals who would not even share this commonly available information. This fact further underscores the importance of conducting an investment professional fixed effects analysis (Table 5 and Table 6 ) to help rule out other issues of selection and individual heterogeneity, such as career concerns.
These findings also offer insights for entrepreneurship, particularly, entrepreneurial oppor-tunity discovery and subsequent opportunity exploitation, or profiting (as seen in the Tesla example above). While many of these investment professionals are not entrepreneurs in the traditional sense, they are partaking in a kind of "valuation entrepreneurship" (Zuckerman 2012a ) that parallels entrepreneurial opportunity discovery. Specifically, while entrepreneurs are often categorized as keeping their opportunities "close to the vest," these results suggest that a similar knowledge sharing strategy may be advantageous for increasing entrepreneurs' likelihood of profiting from an opportunity they have discovered, particularly when facing significant buy-in uncertainty.
Finally, these findings also have important strategic implications for firms more generally.
Firms are increasingly leveraging internal digital platforms as part of their knowledge sharing strategy (McKinsey & Company 2013) . My findings suggest that firm management should also consider how using digital platforms more broadly, outside of the firm, may help improve their strategy and performance. For knowledge to yield a competitive advantage it must be protected; however, its value is directly tied to a firm's ability to profit from this knowledge.
Therefore, similar types of digital knowledge-sharing platforms that connect competitors may have strategic value for realizing a profit from opportunity discovery, especially when buy-in uncertainty is high.
Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Example of Justification Types
A. Simple Justification
Note: Each row is an example of a simple justification. These are representations from randomly selected data and removes any information about the stock.
B. Detailed Justification
Note: This is representative example of the type of detailed knowledge that is included in a detailed justification on RIC. This example was obtained by the author, from a buy-side investment professional, and is not from the RIC database. Further, this analysis is meant to serve as an example and is not a recommendation of this stock. Note: These are the marginal effects of the logit model predicting knowledge sharing on different measures of buy-in uncertainty (Table 3) with control variables held at mean value. For Figures 3A, 3B , 3C, and 3D, as the value on the x-axis increases so does buy-in uncertainty. For Figure 3E , as the value on the x-axis increases buy-in uncertainty decreases. The gray shading represents the 95% confidence interval. 
B. Short-Sell Recommendations
Note: These graphs plot the cumulative average abnormal return for stocks recommended with a detailed justification ( Figure 4A is for recommendations to buy-and-hold the stock and Figure  4B is for recommendations to short sell the stock). The day of the recommendation is represented by the vertical dashed line. If a recommendation occurred outside of market hours, the next market day was defined as the event day. The t-stat is greater than 2 for Figure 4A starting on day -6 and for Figure 4B starting on day -3. 
(8)
(1) Knowledge Sharing The reciprocal of this measure was used in the regression. -likelihood -8,492 -7,479 -7,447 Notes: Unit of analysis is the investment recommendation. Models contain year and industry fixed effects with robust standard errors, clustered at the investment professional-level, in parentheses. Significance levels: + p ≤ 0.10, * p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001. a The reciprocal of this measure was used in the regression. Notes: Sample restricted to only those investment professionals who used both justification types. Unit of analysis is the investment recommendation. Models contain investment professional, year, and industry fixed effects with standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: + p ≤ 0.10, * p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001. The reciprocal of this measure was used in the regression. Notes: Sample restricted to only those investment professionals who used both justification types. Unit of analysis is the investment recommendation. Models contain investment professional, year, and industry fixed effects with standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: + p ≤ 0.10, * p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001. a The reciprocal of this measure was used in the regression. The reciprocal of this measure was used in the regression.
